Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense
Open Access

Research Article

Likelihood of Smallpox Recurrence

Jennifer Gaudioso¹, Tim Brooks², Katsuhisa Furukawa³, Daniel O Lavanchy⁴, David Friedman⁵ and Erik D Heegaard^6*

¹International Biological Threat Reduction Program, Sandia National Laboratories, NM, US

²Novel & Dangerous Pathogens Department, Health Protection Agency, Centre for Emergency Preparedness & Response, Salisbury, UK

³Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society, Japan Science and Technology Agency, Tokyo, Japan

⁴Former member of the Global Alert and Response Team, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland

⁵The Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel

⁶Biosecurity Institute, Holte, Denmark

*Corresponding Author:

Erik D. Heegaard
Biosecurity Institute
Skovlybakken 13 2840 Holte, Denmark
Tel: +45 20 81 02 82
E-mail: heegaard@biosecurityinstitute.dk

Received Date: March 05, 2011; Accepted Date: May 04, 2011; Published Date: May 18, 2011

Citation: Gaudioso J, Brooks T, Furukawa K, Lavanchy DO, Friedman D et al. (2011) Likelihood of Smallpox Recurrence. J Bioterr Biodef 2:106. doi: 10.4172/2157-2526.1000106

Copyright: © 2011 Gaudioso J, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

The 30 year anniversary of the eradication of smallpox was recently celebrated and represents a major achievement in international public health. However, the likelihood of re-introduction of eradicated diseases is expected to evolve with time, and warrants continued assessment. Using influence diagrams to structure the analysis, this paper seeks to systematically examine the various pathways that could lead to accidental or deliberate introduction of a novel or eradicated pathogen using smallpox as an example. The accidental reintroduction of smallpox may occur through three main pathways: Biosafety incident at a known repository, biosafety incident outside of a known repository, and environmental resurrection. The deliberate reintroduction can also be subdivided into three main pathways: Biosecurity incident at a known repository, illicit state biological weapons program, and synthesis using the tools of modern biotechnology. We conclude that the likelihood of recurrence of an eradicated agent, such as smallpox, is small, but ultimately unknown and expectedly increases with time primarily due to the rapid advancement of biotechnology.