Journal of Fisheries & Livestock Production
Open Access

Animal agriculture; Intrinsic value; Cultivation; Normative ethics theory

Introduction

The treatment of animals in contemporary industrial civilizations, particularly in agriculture, is a topic of on-going discussion in Dutch society and other European nations. According to reports, a significant portion of intensive animal husbandry in the Netherlands and many other European nations is, to put it mildly, unethically reckless [1]. New techniques for maintaining livestock are being adopted in agrarian practise as methodical reflection on morally righteous ways to do so have persisted. The agro-industry also exhibits awareness of the need for change. The Dutch Animals Act is a new law that gives voice to the shifting views and perspectives within society regarding how animals are handled in that country [2]. The discussion of animal ethics has also persisted in the interim. In my contribution to this special issue of NJAS, I will discuss a particular philosophical approach to animal husbandry that combines scientific information and findings on animal welfare with philosophical and ethical theory to create a normative view of animal husbandry. This will result in the finding that while some aspects of traditional and modern intensive animal production systems are morally acceptable, a significant portion of them are not.

Following some broad, methodical observations, briefly propose a normative stance on animals. Then, animal husbandry techniques will be based on an earlier constructed model of agriculture. These two models will be developed into briefly given views on the inherent value of animals, on animal welfare, on the principle of caring and related virtues, and in discussion with recent animal ethics literature. An overview of the conclusions reached in regards to ethically acceptable animal husbandry is provided in the paper’s conclusion.

Principles and application

The culmination of numerous scholarly areas is a perspective on morally responsible animal husbandry. The first area is that of ethics which is a systematic examination of how people behave in light of what is good and wrong, as well as what is proper and improper. To achieve morally sound behaviour, people should abide by a number of methodologies, theories, and concepts that this subject has produced.

The outcomes of ethical inquiry itself and their application in activities, however, must be related. A particular interpretation of the theories and concepts to be used in a particular circumstance, as well as the situation itself, is inevitably involved in such an implementation. This essay begins with the premise that no actual situation is ethically or normatively “neutral,” but rather that every situation already contains normativity. People have developed habits in an effort to live up to their principles [3, 4]. These established procedures represent these ideals. Recognizing, observing, and shaping the normativity ingrained in such practises should take place in the context of shifting conditions, producing a diversity of practise performances. The variety results from the fact that every practise is determined by the practitioner’s interpretation of what makes a successful practise. This is what I refer to as the “directed side” of practises, and I’ll talk more about it in a moment. The second topic of research is this reflection on normative practises.

Animal ethics in the narrow sense of considering the status of animals and human responsibility toward them will be the third issue that guides the discussion of morally responsible animal husbandry.

I’ll cover these three categories of thought in reverse order in this essay. I will provide a normative view of the practise of animal husbandry after a basic section on animals and animal ethics, which serves as the basis for a consideration on the issue of how to treat animals in that situation. This analysis develops and defends fundamental animal ethics concepts by briefly utilising normative ethical frameworks. The philosophy of Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd, often known as Reformational or Christian Philosophy, is used in this essay. This philosophy, in my opinion, has several qualities that make it appropriate for delving into difficult ethical problems where a range of normative viewpoints should be taken into account, as is the situation with animal husbandry [5, 6]. I concur with current criticism that much of early material on animal ethics was overly monistic in that the authors looked for a single, fundamental characteristic that might serve as the foundation for an animal’s moral position and as the ultimate ethical guideline for how to treat them.

We must take into account both the unique characteristics of the entity under study and the unique situations in which we are dealing with them in our interactions with particular kinds of things or entities in the universe. I’ll use a Dooyeweerd model for the former, while the latter will be covered in the section on agrarian practises. Dooyeweerd differentiates in living beings a variety of interconnected substructures that together make up an integrated and coherent whole. In this concept, substructures don’t correspond to physically discernible subsystems or segments; instead, they stand in for some of the modal qualities or modes of being that, according to Dooyeweerd Ian Philosophy, may be discerned in reality. At least two distinct substructures can be found in all creatures. The first category is physicochemical, or the molecules that make up the body [7, 8]. The principles of physics and chemistry apply to this substructure because it serves as the substrate for higher substructures.

Discussion

The biotic substructure, which is the expression of the manner of being that distinguishes microorganisms and plants, is the second substructure of all living things. All other living things, including humans and animals, share these two structures. Animals, on the other hand, have a third substructure that can be identified-the sensitive substructure. The functioning of lower substructures is directed and unfolded by the animal’s highest and most essential substructure [9]. The sensitive substructure, in other words, influences the form and operation of the lower layers. For instance, the environment and living circumstances of the animal as a whole affect how animal cells and tissues operate. The animal’s central nervous system serves as the sensitive substructure’s regulatory hub. As a result, animals, such as domesticated animals, can be thought of as a three-part substructure that interacts to express the physical, biotic, and sensitive modal aspects of reality.

The so-called normative act-structure, which qualifies and unfolds the three previously stated substructures, is a fourth substructure that may be seen in humans. A range of acts that are governed by a number of normative norms exhibit this act-structure. This act-structure is focused on the human Self and functions as an integrated and cohesive whole with the other substructures [10]. This Self, the core of who we are, is spiritually qualified in that it directs us toward what we perceive to be an “unconditionally non-dependent reality” during the course of our entire corporeal life. A qualitative difference between humans and animals is seen as a result of the human being’s spiritual quality. This needs further justification. Starting from the premise that normative structures are actually in use, deformational philosophy approaches the world. Since there are also effective forces of disorder in reality, it is necessary to carefully observe and analyse reality in order to identify the normative structures that support and encourage the flourishing of entities like ecosystems, plants, animals, and people on both an individual and a collective level. The fundamental identity of entities is defined by the normative systems that underpin them.

The analysis of living beings discussed above has the conclusion that the species-identity of an organism is dependent upon the consistency and continuity over time of the structuralization of the individual into the numerous substructures mentioned above.Although each individual organism represents a distinct realisation of each of the substructures, the actual individual identification of an organism depends on the species identity. This means that regardless of the degree of actual expression of capacities that are ‘usually’ distinctive for humans at a specific age and stage of development, humans are invariably an instantiation of the species identity of humans. Animals experience the same thing. According to this perspective, humans are qualitatively superior to all other animals while they are alive and in whatever state. My ethical consideration of how to treat animals will undoubtedly take into account this qualitative distinction between humans and animals [11, 12]. Peter Singer, on the other hand, solely takes into account an individual’s identity and actual capacities, and he accurately notes that, in that regard, some animals display stronger capacities than certain humans. He neglects to take into account the status associated with the normative species-specific structuralization of individual beings. The various viewpoints ultimately live in various worldviews.

Results

Animals have a better ethical rank than biotically qualified plants because of their sensitive qualifying. Feeling is the core value of the sensitive aspect and, by extension, of the sensitive substructure. A crucial aspect of animals is their ability to sense and, consequently, experience some types of suffering. The CNS plays a crucial function in the delicate substructure [13]. It is the anatomical prerequisite for sensation as well as the prerequisite for “inwardness,” a different quality of animals that has been identified by renowned naturalist Adolf Portmann. In this approach, he aimed to convey the idea that living things are constantly centres of activity, autonomous agents, and social beings who engage in activities beyond those required for basic survival. The way that organisms interact with their surroundings seems to indicate that they have a goal or “will”.

These two traits of animals are cited by authors in the literature on animal ethics as the foundation for the status of the creatures. According to Peter Singer, an animal’s ability to suffer determines its status and the things that humans can do with them. He makes the case for the application of the principle of equal consideration, which says that we should give comparable interests the same moral weight regardless of who owns them. Singer argues that this does not imply that everyone who shares those interests will be treated equally; the treatment also depends on the situation [14]. Tom Regan, on the other hand, asserted that animals should be valued since they define themselves as “subjectsof- life.” In support of the idea that all forms of animal husbandry are unethical, he argues that animals should be treated with the same respect as people. According to me, Singer and Regan erroneously treat the one trait that they identify as typical in animals as an absolute and fail to recognise that the relationship between animals and humans is ingrained in a wide range of practises in which much more than just the observation that animals can feel or that they are subjects-of-a-life, i.e., have inwardness, play a role. The next section will provide a perspective on customs and their significance for our attitudes regarding ethical treatment of animals by humans.

Conclusion

The notion of what constitutes an ethically acceptable performance of the practise of animal husbandry will always be impacted by basic ideas of the nature of reality, the status of animals, the goal of practise, etc. Therefore, it is advised that everyone be allowed to draw from their own sources of meaning and morality in the on-going discussion on attentive animal husbandry, while also being requested to clarify their positions in a way that is commonly understood. The continuation of policy-making aimed towards the above-described transition will necessitate such a discussion among all stakeholders.

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