

An Overview of the Nature of a Fragile Government in Afghanistan Based on Regional Security Approaches

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Abstract

The present study seeks to investigate the factors and factors affecting the formation of a failed and bankrupt government in post-conflict Afghanistan. Much of the political and social anomalies in this country have been compounded by the weakness and inability of a reliable government. Historical evidence has shown that the government in Afghanistan has consistently failed to exercise empirical sovereignty and has appeared to render services and commodities such as "security, justice and prosperity" weak and weak; And the international community's supportive policies have also failed to break the fragility and weakness of the government in this country, so addressing this issue is essential. The key question is, "What factors have contributed to the failure and weakness of the government in post-Afghanistan Afghanistan?" (Idea) Government is one of the most important factors that has placed post-Taliban governments at the bottom of the spectrum of failed and pre-modern governments. The findings of the article show the formation of a bankrupt state that has caused political and social anomalies in this country.

Keywords: Afghanistan; Government; Post-Taliban; Regional Security

Introduction

Much of the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan is attributable to a weak and inefficient government. From Ahmad Shah's rise to power, a period ranging from the Confederacy of Tribes to the formation of a national unity government in which the presence of foreign forces has become an international character, there has been an overwhelming effort to create a powerful state that serves fourfold interests, such as "Social relations and order" may be able to control and control the crisis, but all efforts have ultimately failed and the government remains weak, inefficient and without popular support. Three different models of policy pursuit have been pursued for the establishment and establishment of a strong and influential government, none of which has led to the creation of a powerful political structure; these are: the policy of shallow integration and the policy of deep integration [1]. Ahmad Shah pursued a policy of shallow integration based on respect for the position of tribal leaders and the tribal realities of Afghanistan, and made the appeals to traditional leaders a priority. Does Mohammad Khan pursue a policy of deep integration that had found favorable the establishment of a strong central government within the establishment of a strong army and the attempt to control ethnicity and tribes? Amir al-Ayn maximizes violence and the use of military tools alongside the deployment of bureaucratic structures and administrative institutions. However, it eventually had to flee the country in the wake of tribal and ethnic uprisings [2].

With the fall of the Taliban monarchy, deep civil politics became the model of new policy making in the country. After the Taliban, despite the fact that the government has become internationalized in Afghanistan, and the establishment of a strong and efficient

government structure, as well as consolidation of its social base from NATO and ISAF duties, all efforts, both domestic and international, have failed; Poor, chaotic rule over Afghanistan's political life and its place in the cradle of instability are "prominent features of today's Afghanistan" [3].

The government in Afghanistan, despite international support for the emotional and psychological control of the masses and the creation of institutions that have functional diversity and legitimacy, has become more powerless than before; so the question arises, "What factors have contributed to the inefficiency of the government in Afghanistan?" The paper's hypothesis is that "the decline of political power, high levels of political violence, low levels of socio-political cohesion, and the existence of orderly chaos" have been some of the most prominent features of Afghan history, including factors that put post-Taliban governments at the bottom of the weak and Before Darren Qrardadhand.

In this research, the issue is analyzed within the framework of security set theory by a sociological causal explanation method. Testing and evaluating the research hypothesis has been done in two general respects: in the theoretical part, the weak and strong governments are reprinted and the factors affecting the failure of the security set theory are discussed; the second is the factors affecting the weakness and failure of the successor states. In Afghanistan. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the factors and factors affecting the formation of a failed and bankrupt government in post-conflict Afghanistan. Much of the political and social anomaly in this country has been linked to the weakness and inability of the government to do so; this has led to a proliferation and deepening of social and political unrest in the country. Since the existence of a weak government in Afghanistan has some social factors, the security complex theory also explains this issue, explaining these factors in the

guidance of this theory is one of the main goals of the present study; thus, the purpose of this study is to explain the failure of the government in Afghanistan. Emphasizing on the Karzai government and national unity in the light of the theory of the security complex. The purpose of this study is "developmental" in terms of "qualitative" nature and "descriptive-analytical" in terms of research type.

Library and Internet resources have been used to collect information from Persian, English and Dari; thus, the research community is comprised of the text community. From the point of view of the timing of this point of departure, governments formed after 9/11 is considered. Locally, Afghanistan is at the forefront. However, it has also become international due to the spread of the crisis to the region and the world, which is one of the characteristics of failed governments. In terms of the subject area, the present research focuses on the sociological study of the failure of the government in Afghanistan. Theoretically, the attempt is to link the independent variable (set of factors) to the dependent variable (government failure in Afghanistan).

Theoretical Framework

The concept of a weak state

Conceptually, a failed or weak state is in a wide range of bankrupt states; such governments are always susceptible to crisis, vulnerable to domestic or international shocks. Failed and weak governments are governments that have failed to guarantee important functions to their people, including order and security, lawmaking, judging and resolving disputes that are the least civil and essential political goods [4]. According to the theory of security complexity as the theoretical and conceptual framework of the present study, strong governments are those that are more cohesive internally and are moving toward finding threats overseas; in contrast, weak governments are those that have no empirical sovereignty over security. They compete with pheromones; such governments are vulnerable to external threats. In addition to this definition, the following definitions have been provided by researchers in the field:

Rutberg argues that state bankruptcy can be viewed as a spectrum that includes a weak state, a bankrupt state, and a collapsed state; in this case, a strong state is a state that faces a certain set of conditions and states that meet certain criteria as The government is seen as weak, distinctive [5]. Olson suggests that the list of failed states may include states that face serious internal problems that threaten their continued cohesion or pose significant internal challenges to the political order [6].

The rationale for the classification of states

Buzan divides the state into two general categories of "strong and weak" based on the degree of political and social cohesion. For Buzan, governments differ in their degree of socio-political cohesion, which is the criterion for classifying them as members of a community of states. According to security theory, the vulnerability of governments is closely linked to weak states and small powers. The weakness of small powers is deeply correlated with the ability of other states in a system, especially its neighbors and large powers, and often results from the fact that they are relatively small or poorly organized [7]. A backward form of government and political instability (here in Afghanistan) exposes the government to domestic distress and foreign intervention. Compared to weak governments and small powers, countries that have strong governments as well as great powers are much less vulnerable.

Domestic political structures have sufficient cohesion, speed of action and stability at levels that can withstand any broad interference [8]. To further explain the concept of strong and weak government, Buzan divides governments into three general categories: "pre-modern, modern and post-modern." Accordingly, pre-modern governments are at the extreme end of weak governments, post-modern governments at the extreme end of strong governments and modern governments are in the middle of weak to strong governments [9].

Factors influencing government weakness

These include factors such as "high levels of political violence, major political strife in government organizing ideology, extremist activities, lack of a cohesive national identity with competing national identities in the country, and a lack of clear and well-known hierarchies of political authority". They have been recognized for their weak government [10]. Acknowledging the fact that no single factor can alone be sufficient to define and explain the difference between weak and strong governments, Bozeman outlines the types of situations that can be expected to occur in weak states, with the presence of any one doubting the strength of the state; Thus, the factors affecting the weakness of the government cover a wide range. A new framework for analyzing security, areas and powers, and people, governments, and fears, cites numerous variables as contributing factors to governments' weaknesses. In the theory of regional security complexes that are internally vulnerable to political sociology, particular vulnerability Analyzes a state, classifies the factors affecting the weakness of the state, both internal and external; in internal factors, it examines the relationship between the state and the nation, and thus examines the relationship between the social and political structure of states [11]. The social divisions and, as Buzan put it, the lack of social cohesion in shaping a fragile state and a weak state have been very effective, and as such governments are a source of regional and global domestic threat, they pose the entry of foreign powers into the internal affairs of weak countries [12].

Applying a weak government and explaining the factors affecting it in Afghanistan will enable us to analyze the contexts and factors affecting the weak government from the perspective of political sociology. According to the theory of the weak state, in the theory of regional security complex, the government in Afghanistan is very weak and fragile and has a set of sociological factors specified in the theory of regional security complex to explain the weak state; in this country, state formation based on ethnicity and Not nationalism is political; moreover, the existence of government corruption, inefficiency and crisis of legitimacy, weak economy and fundamentalism have been the causes of the weakness and failure of the government in this country. Buzan argues that governments, like fruits, are very diverse and diverse despite their similarities [13]. Thus, the government in Afghanistan, despite some of its similarities with powerful governments, has serious differences.

Methodology

Effective factors affecting the Government in Afghanistan

High levels of political violence: Although all governments have rarely recorded violence in their records, even the most powerful states require some degree of police crackdown on criminals, domestic dissidents, and external agents. The difference is that political violence has become chronic in closed societies, and Afghanistan is one of them. In this country, the forms and extent of political violence can be

studied in the form of terrorism, chaos, conspiracy and inter-state war. It has always been the focus of riots, internal power struggles, inter-state war and terrorism. The danger of explosions, coups and riots in the country has created a continuing sense of insecurity for the regimes. The high level of "violence" created the crisis of insecurity and then the crisis of legitimacy, which in turn led to a crisis of political authority and authoritarianism. Long-standing political violence as one of the key factors in the weakness and failure of the government in Afghanistan is rooted in the nature of power structure, social ethics, and non-modern life [14]. Since the nature of government in Afghanistan is a tribe, a tribe lacking a tolerance structure, violence has been used as a means to realize the demands. Tribal codes as a guiding light for politics and government in Afghanistan have always faced a crisis of violence. The emphasis on jealousy, honor, disgrace and revenge as the most important codes in tribal culture has not only destroyed the spirit of national tolerance in the country that has plunged the country into a swamp of violence, and is not a sign of vitality, power, dynamism or civility, but rather a kind of benevolence a sign of political illness. A recent example of organized violence can be found in the suppression of the lighting movement on August 2, 2016; on this day, hundreds in the capital demonstrated what they called systematic discrimination of the government, but suicide bombers attacked demonstrators in Dehmang Road, killing dozens and killing dozens. He left a wound [15].

The gap of society and Government: Lack of national thought: In Afghanistan, there has always been some tension in community-government relations. According to Buzan, tensions between the state and the nation are themselves the source of the greatest weakness and vulnerability. In this country, the national idea of government is weak and very limited, so the government in Afghanistan lacks a broad social base. According to Buzan's theory, the government in Afghanistan is unfounded; he writes: "If the idea of government is not well established in the minds of the people, the basic government will not be sure. If the idea of government is weak or weak within society and even if it is strong but opposed, existing ideas will be able to compete with each other, and the government's political foundation will find a fragile state." "The government in Afghanistan further lacks public and societal ideas. The same limited personal, group, ethnic, and religious idea is also facing serious conflicts; these conflicts have been exacerbated since the overthrow of the national unity government, and there has been a serious crisis between the national unity government and part of the people [16].

During the period of national unity, the tension between the state and the nation has increased. In Afghanistan, the idea of a government is either weak or even non-existent; for example, it is an institutional component (rent) dominating the state apparatus that has taken advantage of this opportunity; while one of the institutional weaknesses of the government in Afghanistan, it is one of the consequences. Its factors are also considered. As James Piazza puts it in his theory of social divide: "A country that is plagued by severe social, economic, ethnic, religious, or logical divisions will affect and weaken its political systems." The political structure in Afghanistan has always been weak and failing because it relies on the pillars of ethnicity and religion. Ethnic and religious domination of politics has strengthened throughout Afghan history. Politics in Afghanistan operates through a system of tribal, sectarian and tribal networks [17]. The rulers of the country, unlike other governments that have tried in vain, have reinforced tribal loyalties to strengthen loyalty to the state and national identity; much of their work on the tribes is to obey and loyal to the state, rather than turning their members into tribal loyalists. National

identity creates the agent, while the ethnic (eternal) identity of the agent and the acceptor makes it possible. The result was the preservation of authority and the social status of the tribes and tribes. Even Afghan nationalism is tribal in nature; Marxism and liberalism are heavily impregnated with ethnicity and religion; religion also serves ethnicity and ethnic politics, so they overlap with each other. The only case where religion created the contradictory structure of ethnicity was the rebellion against Amanullah Khan. Someone called Mullah Lang had a role to play [18].

On the other hand, the rulers have historically restricted the government to themselves and, as a result, the national identity, which should also be the identity of the state, has been undermined. Thus, personal self-interest, tribalism, and religiousness in the formation of modern Afghan political order must be a part of modern Afghan politics. It declines sharply because, rather than focusing on national interests, personal, religious and intra-tribal interests are more in focus, and on the other hand, the coherence of the political system is severely diminished due to centrifugal forces. Political cohesion has been severely damaged during Ashraf Ghani's reign. Many believe that Mr. Ghani is working very hard to restore the power of Pashtuns and create some sort of centralized political power to govern Afghanistan as he wishes, by creating a political circle [19].

Major political conflict in state organizing ideology: In Afghanistan, different types of political ideologies serve the idea of government and are closely linked to the institutional structures of government. Organizing ideology has been so deeply entrenched in the state at some historical junctures that even new doctrines such as "democracy and human rights" have failed to transform it; in other cases, the organizing ideologies have had shallow roots and significant changes in their official positioning have taken place. Marxism and fundamentalism are shallow ideologies, but devote themselves to major struggles and have been an obstacle to the formation of an efficient and effective national government in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the idea of nationalism, fundamentalism and Islam have been consistent, but the idea of communism and Islam, which, according to Buzan, is a universal state, has created conflicting foundations for the idea of government, but in both of them there are powerful elements that are bound by the territorial concept of nation-state [20].

Westphalia: Afghanistan is one of the third countries in the world that has not achieved its Westphalian status, according to Buzan, which is one of the weaknesses of the government. The government in Afghanistan did not boil down to the nation but through the confederation of tribes; to this day, the government and the tribe have maintained their solidarity and loyalty to one another. In Afghanistan, the political nation has never been replaced by a tribal nation because the political and civil nation is defined on the basis of equal citizenship and the will to live together and it is assumed that the government is made up of the free will and choice of all citizens; Ethnicity is diverse. But the tribal-ethnic nation, according to Cohen, is not based on the idea that the nation is a rational association of citizens united by common law and land, but rather on ethnic origins and an organic definition of the nation [21].

In Afghanistan, nationality is formed not on the basis of a civil nation, but on the basis of ethnic-religious and linguistic differences. The civil nation consists of those who share a common political agenda regardless of ethnicity, race, color, religion, sex, and language. Civil society is a social principle based on equality of rights and political values, one of which is democracy [22].

Due to the pyramid social structure of Afghanistan, its political structure has also become hierarchical; this structure was recognized in the Bonn agreements as a political tradition. The tribal and tribal foundations of power in Afghanistan led to a complete concentration and monopoly of power and prevented the division of power and the participation of the people in political authority; this monopoly and concentration of power provided any way to the formation of a modern, national government that was possible with the participation of power, blocked. The crisis of nationalism has thus made it apparent in the failed Afghan governments that the policy-oriented view has not allowed the transition from tribal political culture to modern political culture associated with public political participation; in fact, traditional political culture has reproduced tribal governance features such as tribalism. "The priority is the will of the rule of law, political recruitment based on personal relationships and the elimination of the political rival." The government in Afghanistan should be called the shameless government. The government can hardly succeed in doing its job, and it is efficient in providing political services and goods [23].

Activities of extremist groups: Extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan are the result of social unrest, weakening of the state's identity and idea, moral decline, lack of legitimacy and dense ethnic and religious contradictions; The collapse of the last Communist government and the rise of the Mujahideen have given rise to a causal relationship: something Richard Herer Dekmajian remembers as a model of historical experience. Afghanistan, according to Dekmajian theory, has been in deep social and political crisis and conflict since the collapse of the last communist government in 1992 and the transfer of power to the Mujahideen, coupled with "the existence of a clever and organizing ideological leader, a return to the past and aversion to any modernization." And the emergence of the Taliban. The Mujahideen failed to form a comprehensive national government for reasons such as partyism, sectarianism, ethnic division, extremism, lack of training and political framework. After the Mujahideen's failure to establish an ideal political system, the Taliban, many of which were members of the jihadist parties, felt frustrated with the failure, calling the Mujahideen leaders deviate from the path of righteousness and jihad to Faisalullah [24].

The broad conference of fundamentalists based on the organizing ideology of Salafism and Pashtunism centered on the wise leader, though they interfered with the petition of the Mojahedin government, due to lack of national idea, they failed to establish a strong government. As the fall of the noble government, power fell to the Tajiks and the Pashtuns found themselves out of the circle of power and extermination, this time it was the southern Pashtuns who confiscated the government with a card of purity and prophetic tradition and turned Afghanistan into a terror place. The causal relationship between the crisis in Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban can well be traced. If the rise of the Taliban's fundamentalist and terrorist movement in response to the crisis phenomenon that is related to the lack of social cohesion and weakness of the government during the Mojahedin, then there is a significant relationship between fundamentalism, security threats and the collapse of social-political cohesion. As Buzan emphasizes, "the spread of extremist political thought is a threat to national security" [25].

Fundamentalism is not only a threat to Afghanistan's national security; rather, weak governments such as Afghanistan have a significant impact on the regional system, according to Buzan. It will also undermine security at the international and global levels, as was the case on 9/11. Just as "racial, ethnic, and religious strife" has played a

role in political life and the formation and weakness of the government in Afghanistan, fundamentalism has played a fundamental and prominent role in the social breakdown and weakness of the government, which should be further emphasized in its particularity. Although ethnic individualism encompasses a multitude of different cultural instances, it seems to me that in religious fundamentalism cultural particularism is more prominent and prominent. In all types of ethnic particularism one can identify all or some of the characteristics of cultural particularism, especially the nature of belief and cultural superiority; though these are generally hidden and pale in nature, the existence of these features in various religious fundamentalisms is utterly stunning, it is more specific than ethnic strife and nationalist movements [26].

Since overt specialism in fundamentalism has always been a security challenge for society and the state, Bozanne has used the apocryphal metaphor in the basket to threaten the dissenting ideologies of the state: "The mere existence of a state that advocates dissenting ideology is, in principle, a matter of principle." The so-called rotten apples in the basket itself is considered a threat" [27].

Security threats and concerns: The Afghan government has been highly vulnerable to internal, external threats, and potential and actual enemies; the vulnerability means that the government in Afghanistan has failed to rely on its capabilities, capabilities and capabilities to "contextualize" its strengths, weaknesses and opportunities. And are considered vulnerable, destroyed or controlled by the country; despite failing to enter into military and security alliances with NATO and the United States, it has not been able to contain its vulnerabilities. National security in Afghanistan has failed to protect the four constituent elements of the state, "government, territory, sovereignty and people." The most important political commodity any government should provide to its citizens is security. Survival or security within the framework of realism theory is the most important task of the state, and for this reason, the state is thereby created [28].

With foreign troops in Afghanistan, security is fragile in many areas. The terrorist incidents and operations in different parts of the country, especially the capital, are a serious challenge. At present, concerns over the Taliban's five major cities fall: "Gardez in the south, Kunduz in the northeast, Ghazni in the center, Farah in the west and Mimana in the north" are among the country's strategic cities with high security threats. The upheaval and even the likelihood of these cities collapsing has raised many people's concerns and concerns; at the same time, the Ministry of National Defense has taken these concerns seriously [29].

Declining political power: Governments in Afghanistan have always been weak against society. The existence of weak governments and a strong community has been one of Afghanistan's most prominent features. The accumulation of power within society renders the state incapable of domination or coherent with it. The weak government and its inability to provide security have heightened security concerns in social groups and reinforced their ability to protect themselves from rival groups or the central government, and have made it possible for them to gain political power. Today, not only the Taliban and ISIS are not enough to challenge the central government, but the expansion of the insecurity and weakness of the central government in the exercise of unconditional sovereignty across the country and the inability to employ repressive tools, the social prerequisite, and the necessary conditions. If power is considered to be the key to security in its general sense, each socio-ethnic group seeks to achieve this, whether or not to engage in social mobilization and military or possibly (possibly) preventive warfare [30].

The warlords' sense of failure to gain or participate in political power has been a source of violence and devastation in the country, which has challenged the power and ability of the state to provide security and stability. Already, terror groups have taken security and comfort away from Afghanistan; in addition to the aforementioned groups, there are 1,800 illegal armed groups affiliated with small warlords and local insurgents involved in drug trafficking, seizure of government land and people, forced marriage, Robbery, looting, rape and extortion [31].

The expansion of insecurity and the inability of the government to control them is strongly linked to the decline of political power and weak governance in Afghanistan; on the other hand, creating a strong government is an indispensable condition for personal and national security. One can only say that without a strong government, there would be no security, whether national or otherwise. In the current situation, the Afghan government is faced with numerous and serious challenges in the proper and effective implementation of its tasks, both organized and otherwise, providing security and combating crime, and these are signs of a decline in central government power. Insecurity in Afghanistan has made many of the fundamental programs stalemate. Insecurity has led to despair and frustration in public opinion, especially among the country's elites [32].

Weakness of political cohesion; Internal power struggle: If we accept that weak and strong states, ie their degree of social and political cohesion, the government in Afghanistan has always been involved because it lacks the character of socio-political cohesion and is constantly in conflict. It has appeared weak and inefficient; this conflict can be seen naked in the state of national unity. The conflict of political tendencies began the day after the presidential election and, with the mediation of the United States, turned into subcontinent fire; Atmar's resignation has come because of deep and serious disagreements with government-led policies and practices on maintaining national unity and consensus, securing peace and security, political governance and electoral affairs, good governance and strengthening regional and international relations in the country. There have been in recent months, from his post He has stepped down [33].

In spite of the change in power trends in Afghanistan after 2001 and the fall of the Taliban, most elections in the country have been marred by controversy and allegations of fraud, and the structure of political transition continues to be ineffective and in fact a new form of reconciliation between groups [34]. People and tribes have become; this process is, in fact, the modern reproduction of the incomplete and inefficient tribal and tribal structure of the past. The power struggle in many ways has complicated ethnic and linguistic inequality and, at the same time, made the formation of a strong modern national government out of reach [35].

One of the factors that has prevented the modern and national dynasty in Afghanistan from returning to the internal conflict of power [36]. Undoubtedly, "tensions" increase the strength of weak government and threats. The developments of the last year also show a disappointing appearance of internal problems and tensions. Although terrorism appears to be the most important threat to the survival of the national unity government and the Afghan people, terrorism in the clothing of ISIS and ISIS poses a greater concern [37].

Crisis of legitimacy: If the government is incapable of fulfilling its duties and demands, such a state lacks legitimacy. The crisis of legitimacy and fragility of the state have a mutual relationship and complement each other. In fragile governments, a lack of legitimacy

leads to a weakening of the state's functional and service capacity, and this in turn results in a severe weakening of the legitimacy of the government [11].

The government in Afghanistan has lacked political legitimacy and authority due to its inability to perform key functions in various areas, particularly security and services, and thus has become very weak and fragile. Assuming that political authority only exists for states that are capable of maintaining domestic peace and protection against foreign interference. The government in Afghanistan has not only provided people with security in various areas, which is itself an important source of threat. If the government is the main source of threat to its citizens, has it lost the main justification for its existence? Unlike a strong government with a single source of authority that enjoys widespread legitimacy among the people. According to Buzan, the Afghan government has always been weak and in crisis of legitimacy. Governments in Afghanistan have not initially abandoned consent based on legitimate rule; they have not benefited from a new source of legitimacy that is effective, and the demands of the government have never been fulfilled; in this respect, people have always been against the government; James Rosena's theory fully agrees: "The crisis of legitimacy becomes more apparent when people attempt to create or join subgroups to meet the state in order to meet their demands." The government in Afghanistan has neither vertical legitimacy nor horizontal legitimacy. It has no vertical legitimacy because it lacks authority. People do not support the laws and regulations put in place by the government; on the other hand, the people do not belong to the government because the government is not popular and weak and fragile governments lack the capacity to create a sense of spiritual solidarity [38].

External interventions: One of the factors affecting the failure of the government in Afghanistan is the intervention of foreign countries to expand influence; according to Fred Holliday, it has always been a locus of control for regional and overseas governments because of poverty and poverty. The inefficiency of the government in Afghanistan and its deep-seated and critical security, capacity and legitimacy deficits have provided the basis for external interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, and as a result, the country remains weak and backward. In Afghanistan, more than any other country in Asia, and perhaps the embarrassment of the world, has probably intervened. Afghanistan is one of the countries where Bozanne's theory of weak government and foreign intervention is fully implemented: "Weak states may serve the economic, political, and military interests of the great powers" [39].

The repeated interventions of countries in Afghanistan, if it was due to its poverty and poverty, have been one of the factors contributing to the increase of poverty and weakness in Afghanistan. Weakening of Afghanistan as a strategy by regional and trans-regional powers has been repeatedly pursued and pursued. The interventionist powers have always tried to keep the country weak for their own interests; hence, they have sometimes benefited from internal conflicts of power and sometimes from cultural-identity conflicts to prevent unity and national sovereignty in the country. The Zia-ul-Haq logic framework has implemented burnt-out land policy in Afghanistan; but before that, Britain and many other countries have made weak Afghanistan a priority for their own interests. When it failed to resist the British, it abolished the inactive dominance policy and adopted a policy of deception and deception against it because it guaranteed the failure of Afghanistan. Lord Leighton, in charge of Indian control, believed:

"Afghanistan is a government that is too weak, too weak, and must remain isolated and weak" [40].

The Brezhnev doctrine also led to Afghanistan's weakness and the collapse of the government. According to Brezhnev's logic, the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Afghanistan to prevent the fall of a weak but leaning towards socialism, but its actions did not merely provide the dependent state with the efficiency and capability to do what Geostuzi said was the opposite. During the occupation of Afghanistan, the international community continued the responsibility of supporting the Mujahideen until the overthrow of the dependent government; however, after the withdrawal of the Red Army and the overthrow of the noble government, the primary responsibility of rebuilding and building a strong army and government in Afghanistan was forgotten. The power struggle in the post-Soviet era has severely inefficient, weakened, and ultimately bankrupt and collapsed. With the Taliban empowered, Afghanistan was recognized as a failed and internationally failed government; this led to the presence of US-led international forces in Afghanistan as the overthrow of post-9/11 regional states as a major threat to regional and international stability. Since the fall of the Taliban, these countries have been and continue to be effective in disrupting the situation in the country, in particular in order to align the regional and trans-regional actors and identify the major interests and goals of each of them in Afghanistan. The United States, NATO member states, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, each with their own distinctions, have come into Afghanistan and the disadvantage of the interests and policies of the countries above coupled with the central government's inability to manage the situation have exacerbated the situation. The destructive play of some actors, such as Pakistan in supporting violent groups, has diminished the Afghan government's inability to find a solution to the crisis and put an end to the crisis [26]. In the new political order, Russia, India and Iran support the Northern Alliance, but some countries, such as the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, favor a second group that often includes Pashtuns; They are pursuing their own interests, which are naturally in line with the interests of the Afghan people and foster greater internal conflict; this is what Buzan has theorized: foreign governments are helping the factions involved in the internal conflict. The major interventionist powers in Afghanistan do not have the same goal of supporting the government and combating terrorism, and this lack of coherence has led the Afghan government to bankruptcy; for example, Americans believe that NATO should increase the Taliban's roots by increasing military force. And the situation is under control; so Americans do not want to negotiate with their proclaimers in their policy of declarations; in contrast, the European countries of NATO, especially France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, believe that the Afghan problem has no military solution and only if they choose. Strategic (strategy) over Security and control can be resorting to reconstruction and development of the country, had hoped. The conflict between the Afghan government and the interventionist powers is also one of the factors weakening the government and empowering the Taliban. Talks with the Taliban are one of the controversial issues. The Afghan government believes that if there is to be a negotiation with the Taliban, it should be based on a calculated and coordinated program. Foreigners, however, do not inform the Afghan government of their talks. The British negotiated unilaterally with the Taliban in the southern provinces; these disagreements created the grounds for the weakness of the government and the empowerment of the conflicting groups [41,42].

Conclusion

The findings of the research have shown that a wide range of areas have sustained the existence of a weak and fragile government under the national unity government. Disadvantaged social contexts, long-standing ethnic-religious conflicts, weak and incomplete national identities have made the formation of an inclusive and powerful government in Afghanistan out of reach. Due to unfavorable social contexts, the government in Afghanistan has always been weak and fails to deliver basic goods and services to the people; hence, the Afghan government has been in constant crisis of legitimacy and efficiency, and therefore compromised with various groups. Its efficiency has made it a victim of political expatriates and traders; high levels of political violence, lack of security, corruption and government crime are other causes of weakness in Afghanistan. The failures of the government have continued in the new eras, backed by foreign powers, and therefore a rupture in Afghan political history cannot be accepted.

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